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We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a
preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the
casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first place causes that
candidate to lose the election. The other arises when a ballot that
ranks a candidate in last place causes that candidate to win. We show
that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may
express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle
must generate both of these paradoxes.
1 Introduction
A Condorcet winner is a candidate for election who is preferred by a ma-
jority in all pairwise comparisons with the other candidates. Condorcet’s
principle says that a Condorcet winner must be elected whenever there is
one (Condorcet 1785). This principle may have undesirable consequences.
Moulin’s (1988) no-show paradox arises when the addition of a ballot that
ranks candidate x above candidate y may take victory away from x and give
it to y. A voting rule that is free from this paradox is said to satisfy the
participation principle. Moulin shows that a voting rule cannot satisfy both
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Condorcet’s principle and the participation principle when there are four or
more candidates.1
If we insist on satisfying Condorcet’s principle then we must tolerate the
no-show paradox. However, we may consider some instances of the paradox
to be more severe than others. In that case, we may have reason to prefer
some “Condorcet-consistent” voting rules over others, since some of them
might at least be free from these severe cases of the paradox.
In this paper we consider two special cases of the no-show paradox. These
would seem to be especially bizarre instances. One arises when the casting of
a ballot that ranks a candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the
election. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place
causes that candidate to win. We call these the strong no-show paradoxes
after Pérez (2001) and Nurmi (2002). One or both of these special cases of
the paradox are also considered by Smith (1973), Richelson (1978), Brams
and Fishburn (1983), Saari (1995) and Lepelley and Merlin (2001).
Pérez (2001) demonstrates that Condorcet-consistent voting rules do exist
that are free from one or even both of the strong no-show paradoxes, no
matter the number of candidates. One of these is the Simpson-Kramer Min-
Max rule. That rule is free from both of the strong no-show paradoxes.
Young’s rule is free from one of the two paradoxes; a ballot that ranks a
candidate in last place can never cause that candidate to win under Young’s
rule. See Pérez (2001) for definitions of both of these rules, and several other
Condorcet-consistent rules.
Moulin (1988) and Pérez both consider the aggregation of linear order-
ings. We consider instead the aggregation of weak orderings. In other words,
we allow voters to express indifference. An inspection of Moulin’s proof is
1The phrase “no-show paradox” was coined by Brams and Fishburn (1983). They note
that paradoxes of this kind were described by the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire
into Electoral Systems (1910) and by Meredith (1913). The Royal Commission notes that
under the Single Transferable Vote system a party may win two seats instead of one if
some of its supporters abstain from the vote. Meredith, also discussing that voting system,
describes a paradoxical election:
Suppose that D (Nationalist), M ([Independent] Unionist) and Z (Unionist)
are three [candidates] . . . D has 410 votes, M 400, and Z 500. Then M
is eliminated, and his votes may be supposed to be transferred to Z, who
is elected. But if D were eliminated before M, we may easily suppose that
his votes would go to M, who would be elected. The injustice of the result
appears even more striking when we reflect that, if D had had 11 votes less,
his supporters would have succeeded in returning M instead of Z, as they
desired to do.
Those 11 ballot papers rank candidate Z in last place, below M, and yet their inclusion
changes the winner from M to Z.
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sufficient to confirm that his impossibility result continues to hold true in this
case. It is unsurprising that expanding the domain of voting rules by permit-
ting voter indifference does not lead to a possibility result. Typically, in social
choice theory, the emergence of possibility is associated with the contraction
of a domain rather than the expansion of one (see Gaertner (2001)).2
It is less obvious what happens to Pérez’s possibility result when we allow
voters to express indifference. Both the Min-Max rule and Young’s rule
can be adapted in natural ways to aggregate weak orderings. However, an
implication of our theorem is that every possible adaption of either rule
results in a rule that violates Condorcet’s principle or generates both of the
strong no-show paradoxes.
More generally, we show that, when there are four or more candidates
and when voters may be indifferent between candidates, every Condorcet-
consistent rule generates both of the strong no-show paradoxes.
2 Notation
Let A be a finite set of candidates, and let N∞ be a finite or countably infinite
set of potential voters. Every finite subset of N∞ is called an electorate. Let
W (A) be the set of all weak orderings on A. By a weak ordering we mean a
binary relation on A that is transitive and complete.
A profile assigns a weak ordering to each voter in an electorate. For every
electorate N there is a set of possible profilesW (A)N . We write u−i to denote
the profile obtained by removing individual i from profile u.
A voting rule is a function S that assigns a candidate to every possible
pair of electorate and profile. So, given an electorate N and a profile u in
W (A)N , S(N, u) is the winning candidate.3
Given electorate N and profile u in W (A)N , let nab be the number of
voters who prefer a to b less the number of voters who prefer b to a. Let
ma be the greatest value taken by nba over all b in A \ {a}. If ma > 0 then
ma is the margin of a’s greatest pairwise defeat. Candidate a is a Condorcet
winner if and only if ma < 0. And ma is zero if a does not suffer any pairwise
defeat but does tie with another candidate in a pairwise comparison.
2Nevertheless, Barberà (2007) shows that the introduction of indifferences can some-
times complicate the statement of both positive and negative results in social choice theory.
3A voting rule as defined here always takes a single candidate as its value. Ties are
not permitted in the outcome. This is also the case in Moulin (1988). Moulin’s theorem
is extended to the case in which ties are permitted in the outcome by Jimeno, Pérez
and García (2009). Their results are similar to some results found in the corresponding
literature on extensions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (see Taylor (2005) for an
overview of that literature).
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3 Theorem
We first define Condorcet-consistency.
Condorcet-consistent. For all candidates a, all electorates N and all pro-
files u in W (A)N , ma < 0 implies S(N, u) = a.
Next we define Positive Involvement and Negative Involvement. A voting
rule that is free from one of the two strong no-show paradoxes will have one
of these two properties. And a voting rule free from both paradoxes will have
both properties.
Positive Involvement. For all electorates N that contain at least two vot-
ers, all voters i in N and all profiles u in W (A)N , if i weakly prefers
S(N \ {i}, u−i) to all other candidates then i weakly prefers S(N, u) to
all other candidates.
The Positive Involvement criterion requires that if a candidate ranked in first
place by individual i is elected when i does not participate, then a candidate
ranked in first place by i should also be elected when i does participate.
Negative Involvement. For all electorates N that contain at least two
voters, all voters i in N and all profiles u in W (A)N , if i weakly prefers
every candidate to S(N, u) then i weakly prefers every candidate to
S(N \ {i}, u−i).
The Negative Involvement criterion requires that if a candidate ranked in last
place by individual i is elected when i participates, then a candidate ranked
in last place by i should also be elected when i does not participate.
We conclude by stating and proving the theorem.
Theorem. (i) If there are three candidates or fewer then there are Condorcet-
consistent voting rules that satisfy both Positive Involvement and Negative
Involvement.
(ii) If there are at least four candidates and at least 37 (34) potential
voters then there is no Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies Positive
(Negative) Involvement.
Proof. Following Moulin (1988), we prove part (i) by giving the example of a
voting rule that always elects a candidate from the Kramer set (see Kramer
(1977)).
Given (N, u), let K, the Kramer set, be the set of all candidates a that
minimise ma. That is, K = {a ∈ A | ma ≤ mb for all b ∈ A}. If K is
a singleton set then voting rule S elects that candidate in K. And if K
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contains more than one candidate then S elects the candidate in K whose
name comes first by lexicographic order.
If there is a Condorcet winner a then it follows that ma < 0 and mb > 0
for all other candidates b. Then K = {a} and so a will be elected by S. So S
is Condorcet-consistent. This is true no matter how many candidates there
are.
We now establish that S satisfies Positive Involvement and Negative In-
volvement when there are three candidates. Let us label the candidates a, b
and c. These labels mask the names of the candidates so that their lexico-
graphic ordering by name is unknown to us. Suppose that S elects a at some
profile. It follows that ma ≤ mb and ma ≤ mc. Let us add a voter to this
profile to form a new profile.
We consider three cases. The first case is that the new voter strictly
prefers a to b and c. The second case is that the new voter weakly prefers b
to a, and strictly prefers a to c. The final case is that the new voter weakly
prefers both b and c to a.
In the first case ma falls by one. Since we are adding just one new voter,
all margins of pairwise defeat/victory can change by at most one. So mb and
mc cannot fall by more than one. In other words, ma remains equal to or
falls below (or further below) each of mb and mc as a result of the additional
voter. Therefore, the new Kramer set is a subset of the original Kramer set,
and must contain a. Hence, S elects a at the new profile, consistent with
both Positive Involvement and Negative Involvement.
In the second case mc increases by one, and ma cannot increase by more
than one. In other words, mc remains equal to or rises above (or further
above) ma. So c can only be in the new Kramer set if that set also contains
a, and c was in the original Kramer set (implying that candidate a’s name
comes before c’s by lexicographic order). Hence, S elects a or b at the new
profile, as required by both Positive Involvement and Negative Involvement.
In the final case both Positive Involvement and Negative Involvement
permit any outcome at the resulting profile, so no contradiction can arise.
When there are just two candidates then it is clear that simple majority
rule with lexicographic tie-breaking will satisfy Positive Involvement and
Negative Involvement.
We proceed to statement (ii) of the theorem.
Let us now assume that A contains at least four candidates and that S
is Condorcet-consistent. We first prove that (iia) if N∞ contains at least 37
potential voters then S does not satisfy Positive Involvement, and then we
prove that (iib) if N∞ contains at least 34 potential voters then S does not
satisfy Negative Involvement. The proof of (iia) is based on the proof of
statement (ii) in Moulin (1988).
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By way of contradiction, assume that N∞ contains at least 37 potential
voters and S satisfies Positive Involvement. We make the following claim.
For all distinct candidates a and b, every electorate N and every profile u in
W (A)N ,
ma + 1 ≤ 37− |N | and ma + 2 ≤ nab implies S(N, u) 6= b. (1)
To prove (1), take any electorate N , a profile u inW (A)N and candidates
a and b such that ma + 1 ≤ 37 − |N | and ma + 2 ≤ nab and assume that
S(N, u) = b. Since S is Condorcet-consistent, a cannot be a Condorcet
winner. Therefore, ma ≥ 0. Let M and v be an electorate and profile
obtained by adding ma +1 voters to (N, u), all of whom rank b alone in first
place and a alone in second place.
At (N, u) the greatest margin of defeat suffered by a is ma, and a defeats
b by a margin of at least ma+2. So the addition of ma+1 voters who all rank
b alone in first place and a alone in second place results in all of a’s pairwise
defeats being reversed, while a continues to pairwise defeat b. So candidate
a is a Condorcet winner at (M, v). However, since b is elected at (N, u),
Positive Involvement requires that b is elected at (M, v). This contradiction
establishes (1).
To complete the proof of (iia) we construct two profiles. Take any four
candidates a, b, c and d. The first of the two profiles is described in Table 1.
Each number above the horizontal line indicates the number of voters who
6 3 8 7
a a d b
d d b c
c b c a
b c a d
Table 1: A profile
have submitted the ranking below that number. All other candidates (if
there are any) are ranked below a, b, c and d by the voters.
Figure 1 is a directed, weighted graph that indicates the margins of pair-
wise victory and defeat amongst the top four candidates. An edge is directed
from b to a and carries a weight of 6 to indicate that b pairwise defeats a by
a margin of 6, and so on.
There are 24 participating voters, and we have ma = 6 and nad = 8 so,
by (1), S cannot elect d. We have md = 8 and mdb = 10 so S cannot elect b.
For every candidate x in A \ {a, b, c, d} we have ma = 6 and nax = 24 so S










Figure 1: Margins of pairwise victory
Now let us add eight voters to that first profile to create a second profile.
All eight of these new voters are indifferent between a and c, and rank those
two candidates in joint first place. Their next most preferred candidate is b,
followed by d, and they rank all other candidates (if there are any) below d.










Figure 2: Eight new ballots
There are 32 participating voters, and we find that mc = 4 and nca = 6,
so, again by (1), S cannot elect a. We also have mb = 2 and nbc = 4, so S
cannot elect c. However, Positive Involvement implies that S must elect a or
c. This contradiction completes the proof of statement (iia).
Finally, we prove statement (iib).
Let us now assume that N∞ contains at least 34 potential voters and that
S satisfies Negative Involvement (and not necessarily Positive Involvement).
Take any four candidates a, b, c and d. A profile is described in Table 2. Let
us call this profile u. In this table we use Greek letters to label the six weak
orderings that appear in the profile. We say that there are four α voters, five
β voters and so on. The x in each column marks the position of all candidates
x in A \ {a, b, c, d} (if there are any), and it is written next to another letter
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α β γ δ  ζ
4 5 1 6 4 6
b a d a d b
c c a d b d
a d b b c c
dx bx cx cx ax ax
Table 2: Another profile
to indicate indifference. For example, the four α voters are indifferent among
the candidates in A \ {a, b, c}, and rank all of those candidates in last place.











Figure 3: Graph corresponding to Table 2
There are 26 participating voters. If three of the four α voters are deleted
from profile u then a’s pairwise defeats to b and c are reversed and a becomes
a Condorcet winner. So, by Negative Involvement, a candidate in {a, b, c}
must be elected at profile u. If instead we delete the five β voters then d
becomes a Condorcet winner. So b (ranked in last by those voters) cannot
be elected at profile u. The winner must be a or c.
Now let us add eight voters to create a final profile v. All eight of these
new voters rank c alone in first place, a alone in second place, and rank all
other candidates in joint last place.
Now the graph is as shown in Figure 4 (there is a pairwise tie between c
and d).
There are 34 participating voters. If we delete the four  voters and five of
the six ζ voters then c becomes a Condorcet winner. So a cannot be elected
at profile v. If instead we delete the single γ voter and the six δ voters then
b becomes a Condorcet winner. So c cannot be elected at profile v. However,









Figure 4: The final profile
This contradiction completes the proof of the theorem.
References
Barberà, S.: Indifferences and domain restrictions. Analyse & Kritik 29,
146-162 (2007)
Brams, S., Fishburn, P.: Paradoxes of preferential voting. Mathematics
Magazine 56(5), 207-214 (1983)
Condorcet, Marquis de: Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité
des decisions rendues à la probabilité de voix. Paris (1785)
Gaertner, W.: Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press (2001)
Jimeno, J.L., Pérez, J., García, E.: An extension of the Moulin No Show
Paradox for voting correspondences. Soc Choice Welfare 33, 343-359
(2009)
Kramer, G.: A dynamical model of political equilibrium. J Econ Theory 16,
310-334 (1977)
Lepelley, D., Merlin, V.: Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates.
Econ Theory 17, 53-80 (2001)
Meredith, J.C.: Proportional Representation in Ireland. Dublin: University
Press (1913)
Moulin, H.: Condorcet’s principle implies the no show paradox. J Econ
Theory 45, 53-64 (1988)
Nurmi, H.: Voting Procedures under Uncertainty. Berlin: Springer-Verlag
(2002)
Pérez, J.: The strong no-show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet
voting correspondences. Soc Choice Welfare 33, 343-359 (2001)
Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire into Electoral Sys-
tems. London: HMSO (1910)
9
Richelson, J.T.: A comparative analysis of social choice functions III. Be-
havioral Science 23, 169-176 (1978)
Saari, D.G.: Basic Geometry of Voting. New York: Springer-Verlag (1995)
Smith, J.H.: Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate. Economet-
rica 41(6), 1027-1041 (1973)
Taylor, A.D.: Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation. Cam-
bridge University Press (2005)
10
